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Abstract: This paper brings out that poverty increased massively in the wake of the 1994
devaluation of the CFA franc, despite a significant recovery of economic growth. Although
this increase affected all the social groups, it fell mostly on the urban poor. An analytical
model is presented, which explains this puzzle by the stratification of the labour market,
assuming that the formal sector workers are at the same time the investors in the informal
sector. Then, capital intensity in the latter increases as the former anticipate the cut in formal
sector wages that the long-awaited devaluation brings about. Ex post, they run down their
assets for consumption-smoothing purposes, thus de-capitalising the informal sector firms,
with a negative impact on incomes in the (urban) informal sector.
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1. Introduction
The decision to devalue the CFAF in January 1994 has probably been one of the
longest awaited decisions in the modern history of adjustment policies. The exchange rate
with the French franc had not changed since 1948. While the performance of the CFA Zone
economies were much better than those of the other African economies until the collapse of
most commodity prices in 1986-88, the latter have been undoubtedly much better at
adjusting to these shocks (Devarajan and Rodrik, 1992). Probably, it was in 1989 that the
need to devalue was the most acute, after the collapse of the terms of trade in most of the
zone at the end of 1987, and the decision by president Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire to
withdraw the whole cocoa crop from the market in 1988. He was trying to support single-
handedly the world cocoa market, and this ruined his country’s creditworthiness (Azam and
Morrisson, 1994). The impact of this worsening of the macroeconomic situation on poverty,
in the wake of the terms-of-trade collapse, can only be analysed in the case of Côte d’Ivoire,
among the CFA Zone countries, as none of the other ones has two household surveys
performed at the relevant dates, to compare the outcomes before and after this shock. Figure
1, derived from Demery and Squire (1996) shows that Côte d’Ivoire saw its poverty level
increase as macroeconomic policy was deteriorating, over the 1985-88 period, contrary to the
countries presented for comparison. In fact, the deterioration mainly occurred during the last
year of this period. Not everybody suffered equally in this country from the downturn,
which had a positive distributional effect on some groups (Grootaert and Kanbur, 1995). In
particular, as explained below in section 4, poverty decreased over that period in the urban
informal sector, especially before the terms-of-trade crash which occurred at the end of 1987
(Grootaert, 1996).
Probably, it would be mistaken to take Côte d’Ivoire as representative of the whole
CFA Zone, although it is the leading economy of this area. It fared especially badly after
1986, as its terms of trade deteriorated catastrophically, while some unwelcome policy
decisions were taken. Nevertheless, the existing analyses of the evolution of poverty over
that period of deteriorating macroeconomic policies provides some clues about the relevant2
phenomena to look at when observing the impact of policy changes on poverty (Grootaert
and Kanbur, 1995, Grootaert, 1996). They show the diversity of the impact on different
groups of households, depending on the regions where they live, their occupation, and their
socio-economic status. For example, Grootaert and Kanbur (1995) show that households
from the east forest area had a 20.4 % probability of improving their poverty status despite
the worsening macroeconomic situation in 1987-88, while the food crop farmers had a 39.1 %
probability of doing so over the same period. Hence, one might expect to meet similarly
diverse effects in response to the improved macroeconomic situation that resulted from the
devaluation and the accompanying measures. In fact, a much simpler picture emerges from
the results presented below.
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Source : Derived from Demery and Squire (1996)
Nevertheless, despite the widespread increase in poverty in 1987-88, in the wake of
the terms of trade crash, it was not until Houphouët’s death, in December 1993, that the
decision to devalue was obtained by Michel Camdessus, on behalf of the IMF, in January
1994. The theory of postponed policy reforms, developed in particular by Alesina and
Drazen (1991), Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) and Casella and Eichengreen (1996), points to3
the uncertainty of the distributional impacts of the reforms as the main cause of delay. The
results presented below, which are somehow unexpected, might provide some support to
this view (see also Azam, 1994). In fact, it turns out that the observed growth recovery left
many people aside, as poverty increased.
In the case of the CFA Zone economies, the fixed exchange rate with the French
Franc, which has been de facto linked to the DM since 1983, together with the swings in the
US $ and in the prices of their main export commodities, had resulted in excessively high
wages in the formal sector, widely recognised as such (see Van de Walle, 1991). Hence, the
fixed exchange rate was then protecting “The Lucky Few Amidst Economic Decline”
(Grootaert and Kanbur, 1995). Therefore, many felt that the only remaining uncertainty was
concerning the ability of the wage earners from the formal sector to pass on any devaluation
to wage increases, thus triggering an inflationary wage-price spiral mediated by repeated
devaluation. The French were wary about this, and supported until the fall of 1993 the
resolve of most CFA countries rulers not to devalue, fearing probably a contagion effect onto
the French franc. This did not happen, although the 1994 devaluation took place in an
electoral context. Wages in the formal sector did not respond much, as shown below, and
this explains the success of this policy reform, from a macroeconomic point of view. 
The next section briefly presents the main impact of the devaluation on growth and
inflation, focusing on the WAEMU countries (West African Economic and Monetary Union).
The oil-rich CEMAC countries probably require a different analysis. Growth resumed, while
inflation fell short of catching up on the devaluation, leaving a high degree of effectiveness.
Section 3 looks at the net effect of the devaluation package on poverty in the cases of Côte
d’Ivoire and Niger, where the availability of two household surveys, before and after the
devaluation, allows for some tracking of the change in poverty. Other surveys have been
performed since then in other countries, mainly in the early 2000s, i.e. too long after the
devaluation to be really useful for the purpose at hand. The focus is put on the changes
affecting the different occupational categories, which are likely to represent accurately the
different segments of the labour market. A simple model is presented in section 4 to provide
a theoretical framework for thinking about the way in which a cut in real formal sector4
wages works through the various segments of the labour market to affect the incomes of the
workers in the informal sector, where most of the poor earn their living. This model is a
simple dynamic analysis, which takes on board the widely observed fact that formal sector
workers are generally running businesses in the informal sector, where they often hire
workers from their social network (kin group, village of origin, extended family, etc.). The
relevance of this approach is supported by reference to some results which surprised the
donor community in the late 1980s, and which square very well with the explanation
presented here (Azam et al., 1993, Grootaert, 1996).
2. The Recovery of Economic Growth after the Devaluation
The overvaluation of the CFAF was taking its toll on the economies of the CFA Zone
before the 1994 devaluation, as can be seen by looking at their growth performance. The
three panels of figure 2 show that the most affected economy was Côte d’Ivoire, which
experienced negative growth since 1987, when its terms of trade started on a steep
downward slide until 1992. Most of these economies experienced some negative growth in
the early 1990s, most of them in 1993, and sometimes before, like Niger and Togo. Bénin
seems to have been unaffected by this phenomenon. Two main events explain the bad
performance experienced in 1993 in the WAEMU. First, Côte d’Ivoire was put under sanction
by the International Financial Institutions, who wanted to induce its president to accept the
devaluation, and the resulting lack of any external funding for supporting effective demand
decimated its industrial sector ; second, in August 1993, under the pressure of the French 
treasury, the BCEAO (the central bank of the WAEMU), suspended the external
convertibility of the CFA bank notes (see Azam, 1997). The cost of the resulting speculative
attack, which was easily predictable from elementary open-economy macroeconomics, has
been estimated at US $ 610 million of foreign exchange reserves. A further credit squeeze
followed and made the slump more damaging. Part of the benefit of the devaluation resulted
from the lifting of sanctions and from the massive loans that the countries got from outside.
The IMF and the World Bank started new programs with these governments, which relieved
the self-inflicted foreign exchange shortage. With the exception of Bénin, which went5
through 1993 without apparent trouble, growth recovered in all these countries after the
devaluation, and became smoother. With the exception of Bénin and Sénégal, all these
countries saw the post devaluation boom slow down in the year 2000, with Côte d’Ivoire,
Niger and Togo going into recession.
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The WAEMU countries have traditionally very low rates of inflation, for two reasons.
First, this is due in part to the fixed exchange rate with France, which translates into a fixed
exchange rate with low-inflation Germany since 1983. Second, it is also due, for some of
these countries, to the fact that their consumer goods markets are largely integrated with
Nigeria, through unrecorded cross-border trade, so that the fast depreciation of the naira on
the parallel market entails some price deflation in some of its CFA neighbours (see Azam,
1991). This is especially true of Niger. Although some of the 100 % devaluation was passed
on to consumer prices in 1994 and the subsequent years, its effectiveness has been quite high.
Between 1994 and 1996, the cumulative rate of inflation ranges between 35.6 % in Burkina
Faso, and 48.5 % in Bénin. By 1999, this range is between 36.3 % in Burkina Faso and 52.6 %
in Bénin. Despite this high degree of effectiveness, the 1994 devaluation did not affect much
relative consumer prices, as shown econometrically by Azam and Wane (2001). Using some
dis-aggregated consumer price indices for Côte d’Ivoire, Niger and Sénégal, they have tested
for a significant change in the structure of relative prices by running some regressions on
monthly prices. Only second-order effects can be identified in these consumer price series.
They conclude that this cannot be the main effect of the devaluation, as no significant impact
is found, for most goods. In particular, these results undermine the relevance of the view that7
the main role of devaluation is to affect the relative price of tradable and non tradable goods,
suggesting that this variable has been largely over-emphasised in policy debates about
Francophone Africa.
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Source : Azam (1995).
Figure 3 illustrates the main problem that was facing the CFA Zone before the
devaluation : the too high wages in the public sector (see Van de Walle, 1991, and Rama,
2000). In this plot, the ratio of the wage rate in the public sector to per capita GDP is on the y-
axis, while the number of public agents per 1000 inhabitants is on the x-axis. The chart shows
that the WAEMU countries were massively located in the north-western quarter of this
space, where the average public sector wage is more than eight times larger than per capita
GDP, and more than ten times so for Burkina Faso, Mali and Côte d’Ivoire. By contrast, the
supply of public services, as measured by the number of public agents, was below standards.8
Chad and the Central African Republic, the non-oil exporting members of the CEMAC
(Central African Economic and Monetary Community) were also located in the same part of
the chart. This chart also suggests that wage rigidity was lying at the heart of the problem,
because in the lower half of this space, one finds either oil economies, where the
denominator is inflated by oil revenues, or countries with a flexible exchange rate, and a
history of more or less rapid depreciation, that kept a check on the real wage cost of public
sector employees. The non-oil fixed-rates countries all suffered from excessive public sector
wages, relative to the others.
Rama (2000) has analysed wage misalignment in the CFA countries, and concludes
that real wage rigidity is involved in the long run, and not the type of nominal wage rigidity
that makes devaluation work. However, the post-devaluation record shows that the
catching-up of public sector wages on the price level is very slow indeed. This might be due
to a structural break in the real wage series, as public sector workers had long relied on
France to prevent the devaluation of the CFAF and the fall in their real wages. In this
interpretation,  the 1994 decision came as a revelation that the former colonial power would
not anymore stand ready to finance any public sector deficit, and therefore would not
support the purchasing power of the civil servants forever.  However, wages and salaries
had been cut already in some countries, like Cameroon and Sénégal, and frozen in others, so
that civil servants and formal sector wage earners were most probably expecting that a
downward adjustment of their earnings would come sooner or later, one way or another.
I n  a n y  c a s e ,  w a g e  m o d e r a t i o n  i n  t h e  p u b l ic sector has been remarkable after the
devaluation, while several electoral episodes had led some to fear some wage explosion. In
particular, the 1995 elections in Côte d’Ivoire have given rise to no wage increases, and this
stability has remained in place until the military coup of December 24, 1999, which gave rise
to a large increase in the wages of military personnel. The level of public sector wages does
not matter only from a budgetary point of view, as Rama (2000) has shown that it affects in
fact the level of wages in the whole formal sector of the economy, by contagion. As
productivity is much higher there than in the other sectors, the real cost of labour in this9
sector has important macroeconomic effects, insofar as it affects negatively employment and
output in this sector.
In Côte d’Ivoire, the hourly minimum wage rate had been CFAF 191.4  between
January 1982 and February 1994, when it was increased to 212, its current value (IMF,
2000.a). In Sénégal, it has been 174.9 between April 1983 and January 1985, when it became
183.8, until July 1989, when it reached 201.1. It was then increased to 209 in December 1996,
and to 209.1 in December 1997 (IMF, 2000.b). However, Rama’s results suggest that we
should not pay too much attention to this minimum wage, which does not seem to affect the
wages actually paid in any sector (Rama, 2000). More significant is the annual rate of change
of the average wage in the central government, presented in table 1, for the two leading
economies of the WAEMU, namely Côte d’Ivoire and Sénégal. It shows that wage increases
have been extremely moderate in the civil service, at an annual rate below 4.6 % on average
in Côte d’Ivoire, and below 0.8 % on average in Sénégal, mainly because of the fall preceding
the devaluation. This provides the basic stylised fact of the impact of the 1994 devaluation on
the WAEMU economies : it engineered a sizeable cut in the real wages in the civil service,
and most probably also in the whole public sector, and by contagion, in the whole formal
sector. At the same time, some downsizing of the staff of the central government, by 5.1 % in
1994 and 1.9 % in 1995 occurred in Côte d’Ivoire, while this was negligible in Sénégal.
Table 1 : Annual Rate of Change of the Average Wage in Central Government (%)
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Côte d’Ivoire na 7.4 3.7 0.0 1.5 10.2 4.5
Senegal - 7.2 12 - 5.3 3.2 - 1.8 0.7 3.6
Source : IMF, 2000.a and 2000.b.
This fall in the real wages in the formal sector contributed certainly to the resumption
of GDP growth both by restoring the fiscal situation, allowing public investment to recover,
and by restoring the profits of the modern sector firms, boosting their incentive to invest and10
expand their activity. This explains the growth recovery seen above, which was fuelled by
this boost of the competitiveness and profitability of the formal sector firms. However, this
leaves the increase in poverty that took place at the same time unexplained. The latter is
presented in detail in the next section.
4. Deepening Poverty in Côte d’Ivoire (1993-95) and Niger (1994-95).
In this section, some results are presented on the decomposition of poverty among
different socio-economic groups in Côte d’Ivoire and Niger, from Azam and Wane (2001).
These two countries have performed household surveys at two successive dates about 1994,
that can help shed some light on the short-run impact of the devaluation on poverty. It
should be emphasised that the resulting sample is not a panel, so that a transition analysis as
performed by Grootaert and Kanbur (1995) is not possible. It is thus impossible to
disentangle in the observed change in the distribution of income, as measured by
consumption expenditures, what is due to the impact of the devaluation from what is due to
a sampling problem, such that this distribution would be different even if the devaluation
had not taken place. This remark is  especially relevant for Côte d’Ivoire, whose two samples
are different in obvious ways, as described below. Therefore, it is important to check the
validity of our results by going beyond the global figures, and look at the ‘before-after’
changes using different decompositions of the samples, in order to check that the results
seem robust in this respect. However, this does not seem to be so relevant for Niger.
Only the Côte d’Ivoire surveys are really suitable for this exercise, as one took place
just before the devaluation, in 1993, followed by a second one in 1995, after a full year in the
post-devaluation era. However, even this pair of surveys raises problems, which have
always stood in the way of a fully satisfactory analysis of poverty in this country, despite its
large number of household surveys. As emphasised by Grootaert and Kanbur (1995) and by
Grootaert (1996), this country has long had a deficient price index. The consumer price index
collected by the statistical office has long been restricted to Abidjan, and it is only recently
that a more comprehensive price index, covering some information about the countryside,
has been collected. It became operational for the analysis of the 1998 household survey (see11
Kouadio et al., 2000). Here, the deflator used comes from the World bank’s tables (World
Bank, 1997), from which an inflation of 44 % can be computed, over the two years. It is
probably an overestimate, as prices might possibly have increased more slowly outside
Abidjan. The 1993 survey was a so-called priority survey on the social dimensions of
adjustment, and interviewed a total of 10080 households. In fact 1680 households from
Abidjan were actually surveyed in 1992, and another 480 in 1993, while all the other
households were surveyed in 1993 (see Ouattara, 1997). The 1995 survey was a living
standards survey, with a more complete questionnaire, but a much smaller sample. Only
1200 households were surveyed in this round, 1000 picked fully at random, and 200 among
the households surveyed in 1993. This drastic difference in sample size between the two
dates may legitimately raise some suspicion about how representative is the second one. This
problem does not arise with the surveys of Niger.
Table 2 presents the contributions of different groups to poverty, using the Foster,
Greer and Thorbecke (1984) measure. These computations are done with respect to the
poverty line z  = 144,800 CFAF suggested by the World Bank, for Côte d’Ivoire. Three
measures of poverty are presented: the Head Count ratio (P0), the Poverty Gap (P1)  and the
FGT2  (P2). They are all derived from the so-called FGT family (Foster, Greer and Thorbeke,




















where z is the poverty line, yi is individual i’s income, usually measured by consumption.
The individuals are assumed to be ranked from the poorest to the richest, with i running
from 1 to n, and q being the index of the individual whose income is just at the poverty line.
This poverty measure has two attractive characteristics, that explain its widespread use.
First, it is decomposable, in that it can be computed for different sub-groups of the
population, without changing the total. Second, it encompasses several widely used
measures, depending on the value chosen for α. When α = 0, it is in fact the headcount ratio
q/n, i.e. the ratio of the number of poor to the total population. When α = 1, we find the
headcount ratio multiplied by the average income gap, i.e. the average distance of the12
incomes in the group of the poor to the poverty line, which can be written as follows,







= 1  .( 2 )
Both of these versions of the FGT measure treat equally all the persons below the
poverty line. The headcount ratio is the most widely used index, but it does not take into
account the depth of poverty. The weighted poverty gap P1 does this, but does not take into
account the inequality among the poor, which it treats equally. For example, a mean-
preserving spread of the income distribution among the poor, with some of them coming
closer to the poverty line, while others would move into deeper poverty, would not affect it.
Hence, some authors prefer to choose α = 2, which amounts to weighting each person’s
poverty gap by itself, thus giving more weight to the poorest of the poor. Table 2 shows the
values of these three measures for Côte d’Ivoire, computed from the 1993 and the 1995
surveys, according to different partitions of the population. 
The first partition aims at bringing out the different impact on different occupations.
It shows that poverty increased in all the occupational categories, whichever measure is
used. In relative terms, it is undoubtedly the skilled employees, a typical formal sector
category, who got the hardest blow. The second partition presented looks at the impact by
industry. Here again, poverty goes up, according to all the measures. However, it is clear
that poverty went up more strongly among the public sector workers, and in the commerce
sector. Transportation was more or less unaffected. The sector labeled ‘secondary’ involves
manufacturing industry and mining, and displays also a deterioration of the poverty
situation. 13
Table 2 : Côte d’Ivoire : Contribution to Poverty of Different Groups 
Before and After the Devaluation (%)
         Poverty Line z = CFAF 144 800









Unknown 44.5 55.4 1.73 2.96 0.105 0.252
Self Employed 65.4 75.8 3.23 5.04 0.237 0.472
Unskilled Employee 40.9 57.0 1.57 2.51 0.100 0.167
Traders 38.1 57.4 1.43 2.74 0.086 0.186
Skilled Employees 17.6 36.1 0.498 1.40 0.025 0.085
Others 36.1 52.5 1.56 2.69 0.108 0.203
Sector of Activity
Unknown 44.5 55.4 1.73 2.96 0.105 0.253
Primary 70.3 76.3 3.58 5.17 0.266 0.490
Public 18.9 39.5 0.56 1.47 0.028 0.086
Secondary 34.2 45.2 1.20 1.78 0.069 0.107
Commerce 37.6 54.7 1.46 2.58 0.092 0.176
Transportation 38.1 40.0 1.28 1.57 0.074 0.079
Others  31.0 56.9 1.08 2.49 0.066 0.161
Education Level
None 60.0 72.6 2.83 4.51 0.201 0.409
Primary 47.2 61.4 2.00 3.48 0.133 0.281
At Least Secondary 20.5 41.0 0.71 1.72 0.045 0.109
Farm
None 51.3 74.1 2.29 4.63 0.157 0.419
Exporting 49.5 46.0 2.26 2.29 0.159 0.174
Food Crop 49.7 48.1 2.33 2.19 0.169 0.150
Non-Farm Enterprise
Yes 47.3 62.9 1.99 3.34 0.133 0.260
No 52.7 63.0 2.52 3.85 0.181 0.349
Region
Abidjan 12.7 38.7 0.27 1.71 0.01 0.112
Other Cities 44.6 58.7 1.73 2.73 0.10 0.189
East Forest 62.2 72.2 2.66 4.01 0.17 0.338
West Forest 70.3 76.2 3.77 5.47 0.29 0.531
Savannah 77.7 80.0 4.26 5.56 0.33 0.539
Ethnic Group
Akan 42.5 62.4 1.60 3.31 0.09 0.266
Krou or Voltaic 59.0 65.3 2.99 4.10 0.22 0.372
Mande 56.6 59.4 2.85 3.59 0.22 0.315
Non Ivoirian 46.7 63.5 2.02 3.56 0.13 0.296
Aggregate Poverty 50.4 62.9 2.29 3.65 0.16 0.31314
Table 3 : Niger : Contribution to Poverty of Different Groups 
Before and After the Devaluation (%)
     Poverty Line z = CFAF 150 000









Idle 61.9 83.3 5.89 8.81 0.92 1.48
Management and
Professional
12.4 32.6 0.42 1.47 0.03 0.13
Administrative Staff 23.4 52.7 1.96 2.30 0.33 0.16
Service Staff 40.3 73.1 2.71 5.61 0.36 0.64
Unskilled Workers 56.1 76.3 3.37 4.74 0.34 0.46
Traders 50.3 78.3 3.26 6.25 0.37 0.73
Craftsmen 47.3 77.0 3.52 7.12 0.47 0.97
Marabouts and Other
Religious
63.2 84.8 5.43 7.94 0.83 1.15
Farmers 84.7 96.2 8.02 13.5 1.14 2.47
Status in Occupation
Unknown 63.0 92.6 6.06 12.8 0.96 2.38
Entrepreneur 45.3 54.5 2.80 3.96 0.32 0.50
Self-Employed 70.8 88.0 6.22 9.96 0.87 1.58
Public Sector Employees 26.4 55.6 1.22 3.13 0.10 0.28
Private Sector Employees 84.1 63.0 7.31 4.40 0.82 0.53
Family Helpers 50.0 91.4 4.20 11.7 0.75 2.13
Others  56.6 78.6 3.16 6.94 0.23 0.99
Education Level
None 70.8 91.0 6.22 11.1 0.87 1.89
Primary 43.0 79.6 2.51 6.82 0.26 0.96
At Least Secondary 18.2 46.8 0.90 2.68 0.09 0.26
Farming
None 55.9 74.7 4.64 6.34 0.66 0.84
Yes 77.8 95.2 6.76 13.0 0.89 2.37
Non-Farm Enterprise
None 57.1 82.2 7.10 10.1 0.77 1.82
Yes 63.9 87.4 5.17 9.60 0.68 1.50
Region
Urban 46.7 77.8 2.80 6.66 0.29 0.84
Rural 84.2 96.4 8.90 14.4 1.39 2.79
Aggregate Poverty
61.3 85.3 5.17 9.82 0.71 1.6315
The criterion of education provides also some interesting information. The incidence of
poverty increased the most, in relative terms, among the persons with at least a secondary
education level, in relative terms. Here again, this criterion points at the formal sector, as few
educated persons work in the informal sector. People without any education were less
affected by the deterioration, in terms of headcount. However, the use of the distribution-
sensitive measures shows that all were affected. The next partition shows that people
involved in farming were somehow protected from the increase in poverty. This is true for
the headcount index, and for the poverty gap measure, as far as the food crop growers are
concerned. But it is not true for the last measure. By contrast, the fact of owning a non-farm
enterprise has no discriminating power. 
The next partition is especially interesting. Here, the geographic criterion is used,
decomposing the population first according to the urban/rural distinction, and then among
the rural people, according to the most relevant regional division: Savannah, in the north,
and east and west forest zones, for the south. While the rural people have not been shielded
from the increase in poverty, whichever measure is used, it is clear that urbanites suffered
the strongest deterioration. Abidjan, in particular saw its situation deteriorate massively. The
West Forest and the Savannah zones got a much softer impact. The East Forest zone, the
traditional Akan area, where cocoa and coffee have been grown since the beginning, saw also
a non negligible increase in poverty. Even among the relatively protected groups, in
terms of headcount, the data show that the deterioration is worse, the more distribution-
sensitive is the measure used. 
The last partition also gives some interesting clues. It is the traditionally dominant
group, the Akan who paid the largest price, in terms of deteriorating poverty. Incidence is
then even larger than among the Mande, a northern group from the Savannah. In fact, the
Akan have been politically dominant between independence and the 1999 military coup.
They were the most numerous in the public sector and other segments of the formal sector
(Azam and Morrisson, 1994). 
Therefore, the data are consistent with a story where the formal sector workers, and in
particular those from the public sector, have seen somehow their poverty situation16
deteriorate, and have brought down with them the living standards of other urbanites,
mainly in the commerce sector, but in other sectors as well. Then, some spill over from the
worsened urban situation to the rural one, somehow in the Harris-Todaro spirit, probably
followed, as the rural-urban migration probably slowed down, or even reversed itself in
some cases (Harris and Todaro, 1970). 
Regarding the dates at which the household surveys have been performed, the data
for Niger as not as suitable as the Ivoirian ones, as the they took place in 1994 and 1995, so
that the post-devaluation era has been observed en route. On the other hand, their sample
size is more balanced, as the 1994 survey provides a sample of 3823 households, and the 1995
one 4067. Because the post-devaluation adjustment was already in the process when the first
survey was done, the inflation rate between the two rounds is smaller, namely 10.9 %. This
might be an underestimation of the true average increase in consumer prices that affected the
sample households, because it refers to the change in prices between the two dates, at the
end of the year. This is at variance with the Côte d’Ivoire case, where we might suspect an
over-estimation. Nevertheless, the two before-after comparisons provide roughly the same
picture. In fact, table 3 suggests that the increase in poverty in the wake of the devaluation is
larger and deeper in Niger that in Côte d’Ivoire. Only the private sector employees,
whichever the poverty measures used, and the administrative staff for P2, seem to have seen
their poverty situation improve. All the other socio-economic categories have seen poverty
go up among their members, somehow like in Côte d’Ivoire. In relative terms again, it is in
the urban sector that the blow hit the hardest. But here, even the farmers saw their poverty
situation worsen. 
The next section presents a simple model that helps to think about the way in which
this type of real wage cut works through the various segments of the labour market, to affect
the earnings of the workers in the informal sector.
4. A Model of Informal Sector Wage Dynamics in the Shadow of the Devaluation
In order to go further in the analysis, we need to take into account the type of labour
market rigidity that can be observed in many developing countries : the wages in the formal17
sector are higher than in the other sectors, and do not respond flexibly to the fluctuations of
the demand for- and supply of labour. The first authors to have drawn some consequences of
this observation were Harris and Todaro (1970). In their model, the workers are facing a
trade off between working in the rural sector, where full employment prevails, or in the
urban sector, where there is some unemployment, on the one hand, and a formal sector with
a rigid wage, on the other hand. The migration equilibrium is found where the mathematical
expectation of the urban wage, which is equal to the formal sector wage multiplied by the
probability of finding a job there, is equal to the rural wage. This model has been criticised
by Jamal and Weeks (1993) as giving a distorted picture of the working of the typical African
labour market, putting too much emphasis on the rural-urban wage gap, related to the so-
called urban bias (Lipton, 1977), while wage inequalities within the urban sector are
probably more significant. 
The model presented here does not fall under this criticism, and it takes on board the
typical stratification of African labour markets .  I t  u s e d  t o  b e  w i d e l y  s a i d ,  b e f o r e  t h e
devaluation, that formal sector workers were supporting on average more than forty people
with their earnings. Nowadays, people are citing more generally the number of twenty. Most
of the time, the relatively well off formal sector workers provide jobs to members of their
social network (extended family, kin group, village of origin, etc.), either at home as
domestic helpers, or in some businesses that they are running in the informal sector (taxis,
small shops, garment production, food processing, etc.). Moreover, these businesses provide
an outlet for their savings, which they rarely deposit with formal financial institutions.  The
banking crisis of the late 1980s suggests that their distrust of the banking sector was based on
rational expectations. In fact, in the words of Aryeetey and Udry (1997): “the conclusion of
virtually all studies of informal finance in both rural and urban Africa is that a substantial
majority of lending occurs among friends, family and neighbours”. Azam et al. (2001)
support this view, using a sample of manufacturing firms in Côte d’Ivoire. They show that
this is the cheapest way of getting funding for the firms who have access to this type of
credit, while the formal banking sector caters for those who have no access to the informal
sector, or who want to finance very large investment projects. Conversely, African savers18
invest most of their money in informal sector businesses, or even in small and medium sized
firms of the formal sector.
The formal sector workers are supposed to earn a wage 
F w , and to run
simultaneously a small business in the informal sector. The production function for the latter
is denoted  ) , ( l k f , and is supposed to be well-behaved, with constant returns to scale, and
positive and decreasing marginal returns. Assume that the informal sector labour market is
competitive, with a ruling wage 
I w . The representative formal sector worker, assumed
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subject to the following budget constraint:
c w k f w t d k d
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Applying Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle, one derives easily the following three
optimality conditions, where subscripts represent again partial derivatives:
I w k f = ) , ( l l ,( 5 )
dt c d r k f k / log ) , ( ε + = l ,( 6 )
and:
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Condition (5) simply says that the informal sector firm will hire labour up to the point
where its marginal productivity is equal to the ruling wage. Condition (6) is the standard
Keynes-Ramsey formula, equating the marginal product of capital in the informal sector,
which measures the real rate of interest for the representative saver analysed here, to the
subjective rate of interest. Here, 
) ( '
) ( ' '
c u
c u c −
= ε  is the relative degree of risk aversion, more
appropriately called here aversion to change. Lastly, (7) is the transversality condition.19
Given the condition on the marginal productivity of labour, and assuming a given
supply of labour  l ~ , equilibrium on the informal sector labour market allows to define the
profit function as:
) ~ , ( ~ ) ~ , ( ) ~ , ( l l l l l k f k f k − = π .( 8 )
Moreover, after substituting the labour supply in (5), one derives easily that the
equilibrium wage rate in the informal sector is an increasing function of the capital stock, by
differentiating it. This yields:
0 ) ~ , ( > =
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Therefore, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the dynamics of the
informal sector wage rate and that of the capital stock invested in this sector. It is more
convenient to focus now on the latter. 
The dynamics of the model is governed by the following pair of differential
equations:










dk F − + = ) ~ , ( l π . (11)
Notice that the function  ) ~ , ( l k π  is most likely to be increasing and concave in k. It is
so for the CES production function, for example. However, this requires some conditions on
second and third derivatives, that need not retain us here. 
For any given value of 
F w , one can draw the phase diagram of figure 4. The vertical
line is the locus  0 / = dt c d , where the marginal product of capital in the informal sector is
equal to the rate of time preference of the representative saver. Consumption is moving
upwards for all points located on the left-hand side of this vertical line, where the real rate of
interest is higher than the rate of time preference, and it is moving downwards on the right-
hand side. The upward sloping concave curve is the locus  0 / = dt k d . Above it, consumption20
is too high, and the capital stock falls. Below it, the agent is saving, and capital is moving




F w  was constant, then the agent would select the saddle path of the phase diagram
of figure 4, drawn with a dotted line. However, we are interested here in the case where the
agent is predicting that 
F w  will fall in the future, either because of a devaluation, or because
of any other adjustment policy. Assume that the representative agent has reached initially
the steady state corresponding to 
F
H
F w w = , labelled  H E on figure 4. Now, he understands at 
date zero, for whatever reason, that his wage will be cut at a future date T. How is he going
to respond? In order to deal with this question, assume that 
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In this case, the locus  0 / = dt k d  shifts downwards exactly at date T, and stays there
for ever after. As usual with this type of models, we must work backward to find the right
trajectory. It is clear that the agent must choose a consumption path which lies on the saddle
path after date T, aiming at the steady state  L E , for the usual reasons. The arbitrage condition
(6) rules out any discontinuity in the trajectory of c  at any future period. Therefore, he will
cut immediately his consumption at date zero, in order to follow a trajectory heading to the
south-east of the phase space, and reaching the saddle path at exactly date T. Such a
trajectory is represented in figure 4  by the curvilinear downward sloping curve, heading to
the south-east. This is a divergent trajectory relative to the steady state labelled  H E ,
according to the dynamics prevailing prior to T. It reaches the saddle path heading to  L E  at
point D. 
In other words, in this dynamic model, the prospect of a future cut in his formal
sector wage induces the representative formal sector worker to start saving as soon as he
forms this prediction, for the sake of consumption smoothing. He invests these increased
savings in his informal sector business, with a positive impact on the wages prevailing there,
and he will gradually deplete this extra capital when the wage cut occurs, i.e. in this case, in
the wake of the devaluation, in order to slow down the fall in consumption. 
The capital stock thus increases prior to the devaluation, as soon as the formal sector
worker starts predicting the future wage cut, and decreases gradually after its occurrence.
We know from (9) that the informal sector wage rate will follow suit, going up in the pre-
devaluation phase, starting when the prediction of the future wage cut arises, and going
down in the post devaluation phase. Hence, this analysis predicts that the informal sector
thrives in the shadow of the devaluation, leading to the so-called “informalisation” of the
economy, but begins to suffer when the light resumes. 22
Casual observation suggests that the process of informalisation just described
occurred in most CFA Zone countries, as soon as the structural adjustment programs started.
In the case of Niger, Azam et al. (1993) have described the expansion of the informal sector in
the city of Niamey in the wake of the adoption of a structural adjustment program in 1982.
This was made possible thanks to a pair of surveys of the informal sector performed by the
local Statistical Office with the support of the ILO, in 1981, just before the change in policy,
and in 1988. A point that was regarded by many as contentious at the time was that the
wages in the informal sector firms were going up by about 20 % between these two dates, in
real terms. The number of established informal sector firm, i.e. disregarding street vendors,
door-to-door craftsmen, etc., in Niamey increased by 125 % over this period, while the
population increased by about 33 %. The average number of employees per firm increased
from 1 to 1.4. The local donor community was puzzled. The model just presented offers a
neat interpretation of this observation: as formal sector workers were perceiving their
position in the formal sector under threat, especially in various state-owned enterprises, they
increased their saving and investment in informal sector firm. This had a positive impact on
wages there.
I am not aware of similar data for Côte d’Ivoire, where only indirect evidence is
available. The informalisation process is nevertheless highly plausible there as well, in view
of the existing evidence. According to Grootaert (1996), informal sector employment grew
steadily between 1980, at the beginning of the adjustment process, and 1992 (Grootaert, 1996,
p.81). It increased over this 12 year period by 153 %, while it only increased in the whole
country by 52 %. Moreover, there is some evidence of rural-urban migration over this period,
as employment in agriculture only grew by 38 %. This suggests that earnings in the informal
sector became more attractive than in agriculture over that period. In the meantime,
employment in the “modern sector” fell by 14 %, reflecting the effects of the two waves of
adjustment programs (Azam and Morrisson, 1994). Another indirect look at this process can
be derived from the CILSS survey (Côte d’Ivoire Living Standard Survey), which took place
in four rounds in 1985 through 1988. It shows that the incidence of extreme poverty fell in the
informal sector, for both employees and self-employed, between 1985 and 1987 (Grootaert,23
1996, p.81). Then, it increased abruptly in 1988, in the wake of the terms of trade crash that
occurred at the end of 1987. Nevertheless, the self-employed in this sector remained better off
in 1988 than in 1985, according to this criterion.
5. Conclusion
This paper has analysed the effects of the 1994 devaluation of the CFAF on growth
and poverty in the WAEMU, with a medium run horizon. Examination of the data has first
shown that the crucial channel of impact is the fall in the real wages of the formal sector
workers, which had not been achieved by any other means in most CFA Zone countries.
Labour markets are known to be segmented in African economies, between the rural and the
urban sector, on the one hand, and within the latter, between the formal and the informal
sector, on the other hand. This is what the classic Harris-Todaro model is meant to capture. I
did not follow this path here, and modelled instead the stratification of the labour market
between formal and informal sectors. The crucial link is through the fact that formal sector
workers, who are much more affluent than the other workers, in most countries of the CFA
Zone, are running businesses in the informal sector. They invest their savings in small firms,
where they generally employ people from their social network. Then, it is the increase in
saving induced by the prospect of a future wage cut, due to an expected devaluation or to
other reasons, that drives the predicted dynamics of the model. For the sake of smoothing
consumption, formal sector workers begin to increase their saving in anticipation of the cut
in their purchasing power, and invest more in their informal sector firms. This entails an
increase in informal sector wages, in the pre-devaluation period, as capital intensity increases
in equilibrium. However, when the cut comes, like it did after the 1994 devaluation, then the
savers are running down gradually their assets, and informal sector wages go down. It is
thus a medium-run model of a stratified labour market, as it takes into account capital
accumulation and de-cumulation, while it does not take on board longer term processes like
technical progress and the accumulation of human capital. In particular, it does not take into
account the improvement in public finance that resulted from the policy change, and which
will in due course improve the supply of health and education services.24
This provides a rationale for an observation which seems puzzling at first, namely
that poverty increased a lot in the wake of the 1994 devaluation in Côte d’Ivoire and Niger,
and most probably in other CFA Zone countries. The designers of this measure were
expecting a response in the other direction, hoping that the depreciation would mainly entail
an improvement in agricultural prices, boosting the incomes of the rural poor. The results
found by looking at the change in various standard measures of poverty before and after the
devaluation in Côte d’Ivoire and Niger show in fact a marked deepening of poverty, despite
the resumption of GDP growth. Only the people somehow related to agriculture got some
relative protection from the cut in living standards, in Côte d’Ivoire. Preliminary results
using the 1998 survey by Kouadio et al. (2000) and by Grimm (2001), while using different
approaches, confirm that urban poverty increased in Côte d’Ivoire in the wake of the
devaluation, while they show that some recovery took place in the rural sector, especially
among food crop farmers and export crop farmers from the West Forest area. This was in
part the result of the improvement in world prices for export crops. While unexpected at the
time of the decision, this type of de-linking of growth and poverty is not unheard of. Deaton
(2001) concludes: “Thus economic growth, as measured, has at best a weak relationship with
poverty, as measured” (Deaton, 2001, p.125). The story presented here suggests that the
standard favourable impact of a devaluation, mediated by the recovery of economic growth,
should only be expected from an unexpected devaluation.
These results are not perfectly satisfactory, insofar as the data are not ideally suited
for this exercise. In both countries, there are problems with the consumer price index, while
the 1995 survey in Côte d’Ivoire has a small sample, and the 1994 survey in Niger has been
performed while the devaluation was already done. The convergent results of these two
before-after comparisons, for two very different countries, at a drastically different level of
income per capita, suggest either of two conclusions : (i) the labour earnings of the poor have
really fallen behind the devaluation-induced price rises, entailing a fall in their real incomes,
or (ii) we have a more fundamental methodological problem, namely that consumption
expenditures are in this case a misleading indicator of incomes, because despite some
increase in labour earnings, households have decided to reduce consumption in order to25
restore the level of their assets. After all, the real balance effect is one of the standard
mechanisms whereby a devaluation is supposed to help cutting absorption, in standard
open-economy macroeconomics. Only a detailed study of the evolution of earnings in
different segments of the labour market, which falls outside the scope of the present paper,
can hope to shed some light on this issue. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the poor held a
lot of nominal assets whose real value was cut by the devaluation, beside the wages of their
relatives working in the formal sector.
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